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ABSTRACT 
 
The global innovation pipeline that provides new drugs to counter threats like Ebola or totally 
drug resistant tuberculosis and bacteria has slowed; fewer drugs are being produced and higher 
levels of investment are yielding lower outputs. This paper argues that the innovation process that 
underlies proprietary, or profit-seeking, innovation faces an S-curve effect, which is reflected in 
diminishing returns to investment. A new S-curve is identified, in the form of second generation 
innovation (SGI) and second generation research and development (SGR). What SGI and SGR 
have in common is their use of probabilistic mechanisms of knowledge creation. Probabilistic 
mechanisms refer to the exposure of problem solving processes to very large numbers of problem 
solvers. An example of this is crowdsourced R&D and crowdsourced innovation contests. The 
overarching argument made in this paper is that many of the medical and social problems faced 
today can be solved by a more extensive use of processes associated with this new paradigm in 
innovation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ince the 1940s, antibiotics, or antimicrobial agents, have “greatly reduced illness and death from 
infectious diseases”; however, the resistance of these microbes to these drugs has increased, and they are 
no longer as effective (CDC, 2014:1). Antimicrobial resistance is a global concern because of its 
relationship with higher mortality rates, with decreasing control over infectious diseases, increasing health costs, its 
potential to jeopardise health care gains to society itself, and the negative effect it has on health security, trade and 
economies (WHO, 2014).  
 
 There are certain trends in drug resistance. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), a 
dangerous staph bacteria, multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria,  multi-drug resistant strains of Klebsiella and 
Escherichia coli pose serious risks, particularly to hospital patients (CDC, 2014). Similarly, malaria parasites and 
other parasites are becoming increasingly tolerant to antimicrobial drugs, as has also been the case with drugs used 
to treat human immunodeficiency virus and fungal infections (CDC, 2014). In 2012, 450000 cases of multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) had already emerged, and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) has 
been found in 92 countries across the world (CDC, 2014). Third generation cephalosporins have recently failed as a 
last line of defence against gonorrhoea according to reports from ten countries already; the disease is predicted to 
soon be untreatable as no vaccines or new drugs are in development (CDC, 2014). Resistance by bacteria, fungi, 
viruses and parasites to drugs is rapidly increasing; these trends are not limited to industrial countries but are 
occurring all over the world (CDC, 2014). The evolution of these resistant strains is particularly problematic because 
organisms have been found to be able to exchange resistant traits between themselves (CDC, 2014).  
 
 These trends are particularly concerning, given the emergence of new diseases, or new outbreaks of 
disease; an example of a new outbreak is the current spread of the virulent Ebola virus across countries in Africa, 
S 
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which the World Health Organisation has categorised as an international health emergency (Karimi & Gigova, 
2014). However, the world now faces a global crisis as drug development has slowed; the consequences of rising 
costs of technology development across the world have constrained the potential of closed models of innovation to 
solve problems (Chesbrough, 2007). Historically, research has suggested that the patents firms are developing are 
decreasing relative to their research and development (R&D) investments over time (Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 
1984). This problem is particularly acute in pharmaceutical development, where investments required to produce 
successful products have experienced a ten-fold increase over the course of a decade (Chesbrough, 2007).  
 
 The shipping lives of new drugs under patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry have shortened, 
primarily because research and development (R&D) testing procedures take longer and generics are increasingly 
available (Chesbrough, 2007). Similarly, makers of these drugs also face increasing competition within classes of 
drugs, and these challenges all make it more difficult for firms to justify investments in innovation (Chesbrough, 
2007).  
 
 Notwithstanding these constraints to innovation (and therefore to new drug development), there are certain 
theoretical reasons for why innovation might have ‘levelled off’ in the pharmaceutical industry. One body of theory 
relates to the ‘stickiness’ of information and knowledge, and explains a fundamental constraint to innovation and 
knowledge creation. According to this body of literature, problem solving requires the necessary information and 
problem-solving capabilities to be brought together (von Hippel, 1994). However, the fundamental constraint to this 
process is that this information can be costly to obtain, and it can also be costly to transfer and to use in the new 
location, a characteristic that von Hippel (1994) dubs ‘information stickiness’. Problems that need to draw on 
knowledge and information from different sites require some method to transcend these challenges; one approach is 
to partition tasks into sub-problems that can use one locus; another is to reduce the stickiness of knowledge and 
information at certain locations (von Hippel, 1994). Nonetheless, following von Hippel’s (1994) theory, this paper 
argues that this problem of the stickiness of knowledge and information (von Hippel’s notion of information is 
expanded here to include knowledge) poses a constraint to innovative knowledge production akin to a threshold 
limit. In much the same way that technologies and systems can over time produce less value, it is argued that the 
systems and processes associated with closed model innovation have reached their ‘natural limit’ (Foster, 1985), as 
the ‘S’ curve associated with closed model innovation, termed first generation innovation in this paper, reflects the 
inability of the system to produce new drugs. This constraint is conceptualised as an innovation ‘threshold’, or 
‘constraint threshold’. It is argued that the only way in which this constraint ‘threshold’ can be breached consistently 
is through the adoption of a probabilistic mechanism of knowledge creation.  
 
 The core argument of this paper is therefore that the stickiness of knowledge (von Hippel, 1994) poses a 
constraint to innovation that cannot be breached without the use of probabilistic mechanisms that reconfigure the 
‘knowledge space’ so as to change the location of information, the cost structure of its generation and its transfer 
across nodes of creation, and that improve the efficiencies with which it can be used in new locations. This paper 
therefore makes the argument that at the nexus of proprietary and social ‘probabilistic R&D, there exists the 
alignment of economic incentives with social goals, a ‘space’ in which problem solving can be accelerated 
significantly. Probabilistic mechanisms are taken to represent ways in which knowledge and information harness 
probabilistic forces through the exposure of problems to very large numbers of people (nodes of creation) for the 
purposes of problem solving. By increasing the numbers of problem solvers exponentially, the chances of solving 
problems may also be increased exponentially. The use of these probabilistic mechanisms is taken to represent a 
new paradigm in innovation, termed Second Generation Innovation (SGI). First Generation Innovation (FGI) is 
taken to represent the paradigm in innovation that does not utilise probabilistic mechanisms. Having briefly outlined 
the argument made in this paper, the structure of the paper is now considered.  
 
 This paper follows the precedent offered by other theoretical papers. It consists of certain arguments that 
are synthesised to provide predictions in the form of propositions which are testable. The rest of this paper proceeds 
as follows. First, the concept of second generation innovation is discussed in relation to the probabilistic threshold of 
innovation and three models derived from this body of theory, namely the Global Model, the Synthesis Model and a 
model of the multiplier process that is associated with non-proprietary innovation. Next, precedent for the use of 
SGI and SGR in the form of innovation contests is considered. After this, the technological context of advancement 
is discussed in order to provide an argument that the technology now exists to support SGI and SGR. A model is 
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then presented, which illustrates the argument that at the nexus of social and proprietary (for profit) R&D is a space 
in which social goals are aligned with private incentives; and that this nexus can be increased in proportion to 
financial investment in an innovation process. The paper then concludes with an overview of the arguments made.  
 
Second Generation Innnovation Theory 
 
 This paper builds on other work (Callaghan, 2014a) that argues that knowledge creation can be radically 
accelerated through the use of open source crowdsourced research and development (R&D), in the form of SGR and 
SGI, which represent a new and more effective form of knowledge creation, a new paradigm in innovation that can 
offer much in the way of societal problem solving.   
 
 At the heart of this model is the notion that knowledge creation can be enabled probabilistically, or that 
knowledge creation can occur on such a large scale that knowledge can be created exponentially (Callaghan, 2014a). 
Crowdsourcing has provided a powerful impetus to the potential of the Web to support knowledge creation (Doan, 
Ramakrishnan & Haley, 2011). It is possible that if organisations ‘catch this wave’ of change timeously, they may 
be able to use the processes associated with this new paradigm to solve problems in a way that makes a dramatic 
contribution to societal stakeholders. Callaghan (2014a) argues that first generation innovation and first generation 
R&D is unable to deliver the societal benefits required of a world that is experiencing declining returns to 
investment, particularly in the pharmaceutical innovation pipeline. The ‘probabilistic threshold’, illustrated in Figure 
1, represents the constraints to forms of innovation that do not use probabilistic mechanisms in their processes; in 
other words, FGI. Second generation research and development (SGR) is the process of research and development 
(R&D) which is one of the stages of the innovation cycle, but one which utilises probabilistic mechanisms in its 
operation.    
 
The Probabilistic R&D Space: Second Generation Innovation 
 
The Probabilistic Threshold 
 
 
Figure 1:  The Probabilistic Threshold Constraints Posed By The ‘Stickiness’ Of Information 
 
 There are certain implications that arise from this notion of a probabilistic threshold. One implication is that 
only a probabilistic process can overcome this threshold constraint. Other work has developed models that have 
been derived from this body of theory. Three examples of models derived from this growing body of literature exist, 
namely the Global Model, the Synthesis Model, and the multiplier effect. These are briefly considered as follows.  
 
 The ‘Global Model’ applies SGR to societal problem solving, with a special focus on crowdsourcing to 
direct information and knowledge inputs toward the solving of one particular global-scale problem at a time 
(Callaghan, 2014c). According to this model, if countries in the world were to pledge certain future health budget 
costs that relate to a particular problem, then a cumulative ‘reward fund’ could be pooled, that was large enough to 
enable crowdsourced R&D or any form of R&D to deliver a solution. For Callaghan (2014b): 
 
The idea behind the Global Model is that if all 170 or so countries in the world (those that are able to) could pledge 
their yearly budgets for this problem for one year, five years in advance, then the reward would exist for a 
crowdfunded solution to the problem. The money would only need to be paid by countries if a solution was found; 
countries cannot lose because if no complete solution is found then nothing needs to be paid…If the solution is 
First Generation Innovation 
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found, then countries gain the equivalent of the net present value of all spending that would have continued into the 
future until a cure or solution was found in another way.  
 
 Callaghan (2014b) extends this concept to the development of another model, the ‘Synthesis Model’, and 
explains this process as follows: “What is different, however, about the Synthesis Model is that it can account for its 
own genesis; a SGI project of this nature can use SGF [second generation fundraising processes] to ‘seed’ itself 
using the crowd, and SGR to capture information and knowledge value from the crowd…these SG processes can tap 
into, and make use of, probabilistic learning processes used in nature that have been extraordinarily successful for 
biological organisms and other forms of life, that also use these processes for ‘learning’”. According to Callaghan 
(2014b):   
 
The Synthesis Model is premised on the notion that the entire innovation process can be ‘unhinged’, or ‘decoupled’ 
from FGI processes; so that the process is primarily based on the probabilistic paradigm offered by SGI, using both 
crowdfunding and crowdsourcing. This model is based on the notion that learning and problem solving using the 
crowd can increase its chances of success, or the probability of finding solutions, if the problem solving is spread 
across an extremely large number of potential solvers.  
 
 What differentiates the potential of this ‘Synthesis Model’ in terms of social versus proprietary innovation, 
however, is the notion of a ‘multiplier effect’, where feedback flows transcend dyadic mechanisms; in other words, 
when knowledge creation using crowdsourced R&D processes is not constrained by the need to keep proprietary 
knowledge secret from the others in the crowd (Callaghan, 2014b). 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to extend this notion of SGI and SGR in relation to the tension between social 
and proprietary R&D. The aim of the paper is therefore to develop these ideas in order to develop theoretical 
conceptions around the possibility of enabling breakthrough innovation in scientific endeavours. SGI theory has as 
its fundamental tenet the prediction that exposing problems to exponentially increased problem solving input may 
alter the odds of solving these problems in some sort of proportion to the increase in inputs. This can be loosely 
dubbed ‘The Law of Reductability’, the extreme form of it being that ‘the solution to any problem that is ultimately 
solvable is a function of the quality and quantity of problem solving input it receives’, or S= f(I), where other 
variables in this relationship are considered to be exogenous to the problem solving function.   
 
 The implications of this law seem, at first glance, to be ridiculous. As implied by the Global Model, all that 
would be necessary to, for example, cure a disease, is to simply raise enough money and offer it as a reward. Could 
it be so simple? According to this law, it is. And it is this tension that this paper seeks to address. If SGI theory 
predicts that the solution to all serious societal problems (comprised of ‘knowable’ relationships) is simply a 
function of the input they can generate, then the real question becomes ‘what are the boundary conditions to this 
theoretical prediction?’ Other subordinate questions are: Under what conditions does this law hold, and what 
denotes a problem as ‘ultimately solvable’, or comprised of knowable relationships? This paper seeks to identify a 
specific ‘locale’, or ‘space’ which exists at the nexus of social SGR and proprietary SGR, in which the social 
objectives of innovation are aligned with private incentives. This model, termed the Nexus Model, offers a 
perspective of a ‘nexus’ space, which can be increased in proportion to the financial investments contributed toward 
the solving of a particular problem (which is inherently solvable).  
 
 For the purposes of this work, a problem is considered to be ultimately solvable if the state of its solution is 
a function of discrete processes that can be manipulated by problem solvers. This implies that knowledge itself falls 
into two categories: (i) what can be known (what is comprised of knowable relationships) and (ii) what cannot be 
known (what is comprised of ‘unknowable’ relationships). Finding a solution to curing a disease might be 
considered a function of permutations of processes that will yield multiple different sources of potential solutions. 
Finding a solution to time travel (to keep with the ridiculous) might fall into the latter category. However, in the 
absence of categorical knowledge of whether a solution might fall into either of these, the only way to find out might 
be to enable a large enough scale of investments of inputs into a problem solving process.  
 
 Aligning the incentive mechanisms to support the operationalisation of these models, however, seems to be 
a necessary condition for their success in producing innovations. If private, or proprietary, systems of innovation 
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cannot be relied upon to deliver innovation, or to maintain a pipeline of societally important innovations, then 
alternative models of innovation are needed. One potential solution to this incentivisation problem is the use of 
online innovation contests (Hallerstede & Bullinger, 2010). This is a rapidly developing field, albeit relatively new 
and small at present, but with unexplored potential for problem solving (Hallerstede & Bullinger, 2010).  
 
Innovation Contests: An Example Of Open Probability-Based Innovation 
 
 Innovation contests might be considered examples of open innovation that utilise the probabilistic 
mechanism of large-number problem solving, as problems are exposed to large numbers of problem solvers. 
Examples of innovation contexts in history abound. Napoleon III of France, for example, used an innovation contest 
to find a replacement for butter in 1869; from this, margarine emerged (Hallerstede & Bullinger, 2010).  
 
 Hallerstede and Bullinger (2010) studied 65 innovation contests (web-based competitions of innovators 
who provide solutions to contest challenges) to understand how to categorise them. Hallerstede and Bullinger (2010) 
categorised innovation contests into three main clusters, or types, namely (i) community-based, which use social 
media and are typically aimed at community building and offer non-monetary rewards; (ii) expert-based, which use 
social media but are primarily aimed at providing solutions to explicitly specified tasks, including prototypes, which 
are evaluated by experts; and (iii) mob-based, which run for a long time, using limited social media, and either offer 
monetary or non-monetary rewards (but not mixed), with inputs that are moderately elaborated and are based on 
ideas. An example of a mob-based innovation contest is the Virgin Earth Challenge which requested contributors to 
provide a commercially viable design which would result in the removal of greenhouse gasses (Hallerstede & 
Bullinger, 2010). Notably the levels of confidentiality rise from (i) to (ii) and further to (iii), and rarely do any of 
these forms use Wikis, discussion forums or tagging systems to discriminate between contributions, indicating 
perhaps that relatively little collaborative contributions occur (Hallerstede & Bullinger, 2010). The lack of 
knowledge sharing that is associated with the need to keep inputs secret, however, constrains the knowledge creation 
process by keeping it dyadic in nature (Callaghan, 2014a). The community and mob-based types were found to be 
most appropriate when budget constraints exist, as they seem to motivate innovators through non-monetary rewards; 
this was not the case for expert-based types, which typically require higher levels of reward because of the more 
elaborate solutions or prototypes they seek (Hallerstede & Bullinger, 2010). A differentiation is evident in the 
literature, which reflects a phenomenon whereby individuals contribute to open innovation for other motivations 
than those associated with remuneration. In order to place probability-based innovation as conceptualised in this 
paper in relation to the innovation literature in general, the first order of business is to place crowdsourced R&D, or 
SGR, as a form of SGI, in relation to other forms of innovation. One way of doing this is to place SGR in relation to 
typologies of innovation.  
 
Placing Probability-Based Innovation In Relation To Typologies Of Innovation 
 
 According to Pravitt’s (1984) seminal typology, the characteristics of variations in innovations can be 
categorised according to whether the innovation is (i) supplier dominated; (ii) production intensive; or (iii) science 
based, and according to differences in sources of technology, the requirements of users, and possibilities for 
appropriation. For Pravitt (1984:343), this explanation of types of innovation “has implications for our 
understanding of the sources and directions of technical change, firms’ diversification behaviour, the dynamic 
relationship between technology and industrial structure, and the formation of technological skills and advantages at 
the level of the firm, the region and the country.” For Salter and Martin (2001), there is also a typology of the 
benefits from public investment in basic research, which varies by scientific field, technology and industrial sector. 
The importance of this typology relates to the need for state funding for basic research to take into account these 
differences, over and above the need for state funding to address market failure (Salter & Martin, 2001). There are 
two rates of return to research: (i) private rates of return, or “return on investments in research that flow from an 
individual research project to the organisation directly involved”, or social rates of return, which accrue to society in 
general (Salter & Martin, 2001:514). It is argued here that at the nexus of social and proprietary probabilistic, or SG 
innovation is an ‘innovation space’ in which social goals are also aligned with private incentives. It is in this ‘space’ 
that breakthroughs might be significantly more likely.   
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 Historically, neoclassical models of technological change have considered the production of technology 
itself and innovations as exogenous and have not taken into consideration the diversity or variety inherent in the 
“sources, nature and uses of innovations” (Pravitt, 1984:343). For the purposes of this paper, innovation is defined 
as “a new or better product or production process”, following Pravitt (1984:343), yet sans the requirement 
“successfully commercialised”; SGI is taken to represent any part of the innovation process that utilises a 
probabilistic process, or that utilises a mechanism through which the use of large numbers of inputs are 
incorporated. The notion “successfully diffused” is preferred, given that social innovation is the focus of the 
arguments made in this paper.  
 
 SGI potentially also encompasses a different conception of innovation; one that explores the potentialities 
associated with the relaxation of the knowledge management requirements associated with the need for proprietary 
control of knowledge, particularly in the three dimensional space of knowledge creation where the knowledge 
multiplier effect is enabled through these relaxations. The differentiation of SGI from FGI gives rise to another 
typology of innovations. Within this differentiation, a further differentiation can be taken to exist, between 
proprietary probabilistic innovation and social probabilistic innovation, the former associated with profit-seeking 
and the latter associated with outcomes that are pursued for social benefit yet not necessarily for profit. It is argued 
that at the nexus of these two types is an innovation ‘space’, within which both profit-seeking and socially oriented 
probabilistic innovation types are aligned in their goals and targeted outcomes. This ‘space’ is diagrammatically 
represented in Figure 2, which is discussed later.      
 
 Probabilistic mechanisms of SGI such as crowdsourcing are not without their pitfalls. These pitfalls might 
be considered to represent yet another typology. The following are examples of constraints to the use of 
crowdsourcing offered by Davenport, Cummings, Daellenbach and Campbell (2013:15): (i) project delays, because 
there is no guarantee that the crowd can provide the solutions or have the motivation to do so; (ii) low quality, as 
oftentimes contributors are not professionals and quality control might be absent from the process; (iii) ambiguous 
liability, which may mean that there is no accountability for poor quality work; (iv) the temporary relationships 
associated with crowdsourcing, which might lead to lower quality output; (v) the professionalism of internal 
employees or traditional contractors, which might be undermined; (vi) an identity clash might exist, as 
crowdsourcing winners’ solutions might not fit with the culture of the organisation; (vii) exploitation and reputation 
effects might be problematic when low wages or no wages are used to exploit intellectual property with no 
contractual obligations, and ethical issues arise which can have reputational consequences; and (viii) losers in 
crowdsourcing can be discouraged and this can arouse negative attitudes towards the company or with the 
crowdsourcing initiative.      
 
 In such a relatively new field, the notion of typologies might be useful, because they may provide a 
framework against which the boundary conditions of theory and predictions can be mapped as the field progresses. 
Notwithstanding these typologies, there seem to be two dimensions along which innovation and problem solving in 
science can be accelerated. Firstly, this acceleration may occur through the enablement of technology in general and 
through the knowledge management potential of technology in particular. Secondly, this acceleration may occur 
through the exponential increase in knowledge that can result from connecting people together in a way that 
increases the probability of findings solutions to problems. Although the true potential of these dimensions may 
work optimally when combined, for the purposes of discussion within this paper these are now considered 
separately. In order to make arguments that relate to how people can use SGI and SGR, it is first necessary to offer a 
perspective of what support technology can provide to these processes.  
 
Reaching Critical Mass-Technological Knowledge Accumulation In Unsupervised Modes 
 
 The acceleration of knowledge creation has been considered from different perspectives. Certain theorists 
have argued for the creation of self-supervised machine learning systems to create volumes of structured data, which 
then create opportunities of individuals to create applications (Wu & Weld, 2007). This is useful because an 
information system would work best if it “autonomously extracts information from the Web”, operating in an 
unsupervised or self-supervised mode (Wu & Weld, 2007:41). These technologies seem uniquely placed to support 
SGI processes.  
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 The logic that underpins these processes is the knowledge redundancy that exists on the Web, providing 
enough variance in the language of items that simple versions of information can be picked up (Wu & Weld, 2007). 
Nevertheless, incorrect information can also be picked up, and Wu and Weld (2007) propose a prototype system, 
termed ‘KYLIN’, which can autonomously extract structured data in a way that improves on the Wikipedia system 
in a way that reduces the challenges associated with collaboratively authored data which is typically associated with 
noise and incompleteness. This is just one example of probabilistic machine learning, which is perhaps analogous to 
the SGI and SGR processes, which relate to human learning.  
 
 Wu and Weld (2007) used Wikipedia as a basis for the development of their proposed prototype. Wikipedia 
can also be taken to offer insights that may contribute to the vision of crowdsourced R&D. Wikipedia is therefore a 
useful example of a platform off which social crowdsourcing in the form of open R&D can be launched to solve 
societally important scientific problems. The technology to support radical process innovations in the realm of 
crowdsourced R&D seems to already exist. In fact, SGI and SGR are perhaps only practically possible because of 
these advances in technology.  
 
 Other work on the Semantic Web suggests that semantic mappings are needed between ontologies, and 
advances have been made that allow the taxonomic structures of ontologies, which increase the abilities of the Web 
to support learning on a large scale (Doan, Madhavan, Dhamankar, Domingos & Halevy, 2003). The large scale of 
this ‘artificial’ learning, on a large or probabilistic scale, can be a complement to the human cognitive learning if the 
latter can be enabled on a similar scale. At the heart of any acceleration in knowledge creation, however, is the 
ability to capture knowledge and successes in a process model that is continually updated based on knowledge of 
prior successes and failures. The notion of an on-line process handbook is just one useful example of how this might 
be done.  
 
 The idea has been mooted of collecting examples of how processes are performed in different organisations 
and developing an on-line process handbook (Malone, Crowston, Lee, Pentland, Dellarocas, Wyner, Quimby, 
Osborn, Bernstein, Herman, Klein & O’Donnell, 1999). In this way, others could redesign processes and develop 
new ones that can take advantages of the changes in technology, while providing insight at the different levels of 
abstraction and of the deep structure of the similarity between processes (Malone et al., 1999). Process innovations 
that ‘catch on’ can quickly become ‘best practices’, and information technology will continue to provide 
opportunities for more process innovations to continually emerge, but for “quicker progress on these problems, 
however, our best hope is to develop a more systematic theoretical and empirical foundation for understanding 
organizational processes” (Malone et al., 1999). A more comprehensive review of literature that specifically relates 
to technological processes related to second generation innovation is, however, beyond the scope of this work. This 
body of literature seems to suggest that technology has progressed to the point at which it might support SGI and 
SGR in the form of a new paradigm of scientific investigation. It is possible that the emergence of SGI and SGR is a 
natural extension of the trend toward open innovation itself, and that these represent an underlying process 
innovation that offers the potential of a new S-curve that will transcend FGR. However, it is the technology 
underlying the use of SGI and SGR that is perhaps driving this new paradigm, and that is inherently related to the 
emergence of a new S-curve in innovation as a field itself.  
 
The Trend Towards Open Innovation: Placing Second Generation Innovation In Relation To The Trajectory 
Of Change In Innovation Theory 
 
 For Chesbrough (2007), innovation has been trending toward openness, or an open process, because of a 
growing division of labour. For example, a firm might have the competencies to develop a novel idea but bringing 
this idea to market might in turn require different competencies (Chesbrough, 2007). By opening business models, it 
is possible for firms to search for and exploit outside ideas and to allow unused internal technologies to flow ‘to the 
outside’, which allows their latent economic potential to be exploited (Chesbrough, 2007). It is perhaps at the nexus 
of (i) private models of innovation, that have turned to open innovation, and (ii) social models of innovation (not-
for-profit, but for societal good) that have also turned to open innovation (in order to transcend the limitations of 
revenue generation), that the space for radical social innovation can occur. At this nexus, the objectives of each 
coincide- the goals of those involved in social innovation are also aligned with the incentives provided by profit-
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seeking innovation. Both social and proprietary innovation can take advantage of the platform provided by second 
generation innovation, and its model of open innovation. 
 
 Opening the business model itself offers a new ‘frontier’ in innovation, according to Chesbrough (2007). At 
the heart of this process of innovation, however, is the notion that these process are driven by a business model; a 
business model creates value (through a series of value-adding activities) and attempts to capture as much of this 
value as possible (through the development of a unique resource or process) that provides competitive advantage 
(Chesbrough, 2007). Open business models allow synergies with other firms to be exploited because different firms 
have different configurations of assets, resources and market positions, and new configurations might add value, 
which other firms might be more familiar with (Chesbrough, 2007). However, if innovations require business 
models to structure the creation of value and the capture of this value then it is more difficult to facilitate social 
innovation that cannot sustain a business model.  
 
 For Chesbrough (2007), the markets for innovation can be highly inefficient, as technology and its 
intellectual property exchanges are typically at the mercy of processes dominated by brokers and patent attorneys, 
and knowledge of prices and volumes of activity is obscured. The consequence of this is that value-adding trade and 
exchange in innovation does not happen due to high costs and a lack of knowledge; innovation therefore remains ‘on 
the shelf’ (Chesbrough, 2007). For Chesbrough (2007), firms may typically only use between 5-25% of their 
patents, while the rest remain dormant; which is becoming a more serious issue in a global context of a rising cost of 
technology development across many industries. This also has implications for social innovation, which requires a 
much higher rate of innovation than this in order to solve societal problems.  
 
 This problem is particularly acute in pharmaceutical development where investments in successful products 
have typically required a ten-fold increase over the course of a decade (Chesbrough, 2007). There is an implication 
that arises from this - that only large firms will get bigger, leaving others behind, while at the same shortening 
product life-cycles, the presence of generics and increasing competition within drug classes are creating economic 
pressures on innovation, or reducing the incentives firms have to invest in innovation (Chesbrough, 2007).  
 
 However, open innovation can address these challenges, through its influence on (i) the cost side, using 
external R&D resources to achieve time and cost advantages, and (ii) the revenue side, by licensing technologies 
from other sources, or alternatively by licensing technologies to others (Chesbrough, 2007). Therefore, by opening 
business models up, the reduced costs of innovation and its potential benefits make innovation more attractive, 
notwithstanding the influence of shorter product life cycles (Chesbrough, 2007).  
 
 Firms should experiment with their business models, and create processes that enable this, but typically the 
incentives of managers at different levels of the organisation are not aligned with this type of process innovation, 
according to Chesbrough (2007). Companies like Google experiment, for example, using separate Web sites to elicit 
customer feedback, and spin-offs and start-ups can also be used to this end (Chesbrough, 2007). Gains have also 
been realised by companies like IBM who have changed their strategy from defensively keeping intellectual 
property secret to offensively licensing it to outside parties, including competitors, which has proved to offer 
profitability advantages (Chesbrough, 2007). In fact, IBM has been spending about $100 million per year on 
developing Linux open source software for its own use, saving development costs by tapping into the potential of 
open innovation (Chesbrough, 2007).  
 
 The recognition of open source by IBM is reflected in its donation of over 500 of its software patents to the 
open source community, to develop the ‘intellectual commons’ of open source software (Chesbrough, 2007). Proctor 
and Gamble (P&G) have also set up an R&D strategy that sought to bring in half of its ideas externally, which has 
allowed them to increase their innovation capacity without an increase in costs (Chesbrough, 2007). Oftentimes, 
however, it takes a crisis to change the mindset of an organisation in cases where open innovation has been taken up 
as part of new business models, yet open innovation is necessary to increase the innovation capacity of organisations 
(Chesbrough, 2007).  
 
 For Chesbrough (2007) the shift to a more open model of innovation can be achieved by typically 
following two processes: (i) adjusting the business model to manage higher volume, while standardising or 
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automating certain processes and (ii) obtaining ‘buy in’ from many important sectors within the company, as ‘losers’ 
are inevitably created as resources are re-channelled toward the new business model and resistance emerges. 
However, for many organisations the alternative to opening up business models might be business declines in many 
contexts (Chesbrough, 2007). A range of forces can be taken to be exerting an influence on businesses to 
increasingly take up open models of innovation, such as crowdsourcing.  
 
 Crowdsourcing has grown rapidly, with lobby-group support emerging (Finzen and Kinz, 2012). 
Crowdsourcing has been incorporated into business models more slowly in certain national contexts, for example in 
Germany (Finzen and Kinz, 2012). Diversity typically contributes to innovation, through the collaboration between 
universities, private firms, corporate research laboratories and public research institutes (Bienkowska, Larsen and 
Sӧrlin, 2010). The development of innovative capabilities for innovation clusters is also enabled by labour mobility 
(Bienkowska, Lundmark and Malmberg, 2011).  
 
 Certain countries such as China and India have scale advantages and bargaining power associated with their 
innovation and R&D growth (Karabag, Tuncay-Celikel and Beggren, 2011). However, these advantages are not 
available to many developing countries, which require active private capital together with economies of scale in 
production and support from public policies in order to attract international R&D (Karabag et al., 2011). The pattern 
of R&D does not therefore entirely reflect path-dependent locational effects of human capital in the new global 
knowledge economy, and also does not reflect homogeneity (Karabag et al., 2011).  
 
 Pharmaceutical R&D seems to locate globally based on agglomeration and cluster economies that provide a 
‘critical mass’ in research; this tends to favour cites in the United States, Europe, Japan and China (Karabag et al., 
2011). However, clinical development and testing is dependent on scale economies in patient numbers and networks 
of testing physicians and follow-up opportunities; the locational advantages of R&D versus clinical testing differ in 
their optimum location (Karabag et al., 2011). However, crowdsourced R&D can offer independence from 
locational constraints.  
 
 An important question that has dominated the R&D literature over time is whether public R&D is a 
complement (‘adds to’) or a substitute for (‘crowds out’) private R&D (David, Hall & Tool, 2000). Other research, 
however, has found an absence of crowding out, on either a full or partial basis, between public and private R&D 
spending; and that certain firms in small or low technology sectors might not undertake R&D if subsidies are not 
provided (González & Pazó, 2008). Other studies have found that tax credits for R&D can result in the creation of 
the same magnitude of additional R&D (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). What this body of literature has in common is 
its consideration of constraints to R&D, which can be surmounted to some extent through the use of second 
generation R&D.  
 
 Examples of innovation contests abound in the literature. Napoleon III of France used one to discover 
margarine, a substitute for butter, and the Orteig Prize for the first nonstop flight between New York and Paris 
contributed to the emergence of the airline industry (Hallerstede & Bullinger, 2010).  
 
 Terwiesch and Xu (2008) offer a typology of products and cost structures that are relatively more suited to 
using contests to stimulate innovation. For Terwiesch and Xu (2008:1529) the “detailed mechanics of R&D differ 
widely by industry, reflecting different cost structures, different success rates, and different market rewards, but the 
innovation process is remarkably similar across industries” as drug “candidates in a pharmaceutical development 
process, TV shows in an entertainment company, and proposals in a venture capital firm all flow through a 
conceptually similar innovation process”. Open innovation relies on altruism and the status needs of open source 
community members, or self-interest that is not primarily related to financial rewards; on the other hand, innovation 
contests offer explicit rewards for innovations (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008).  
 
 In a context of off-shoring and outsourcing innovation, innovation contests have come of age as a basis for 
“solid R&D problem solving in recent years” (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). InnoCentive is a firm that puts seekers 
together with solvers, to the tune of 95000 around the world, as scientific problems and the rules of the contest are 
communicated to this ‘crowd’ (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). If the solutions are acceptable, the seeker buys the 
intellectual property from the solver; common rewards range from $10000 to $50000 (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). 
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Seekers benefit from this process because it generates competition between solvers, only successes are paid for (the 
incidence of failed investment in innovation falls to the solvers), a wide range of providers are available which 
increases the chances of problem solving, cost savings exist through wage arbitrage, and a higher level of idea 
generation and testing is enabled (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008).  
 
 However, there are certain problematic aspects of crowdsourced R&D in the form of innovation contests, 
namely the potential for solvers to not be financially compensated for their efforts, which can lead to 
underinvestment and inefficiency in the market for solutions, unless the reward system is better aligned to address 
this (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). Terwiesch and Xu (2008) contest the notion that innovation contests optimise problem 
solving when limited to two contestants because of underinvestment effects that exist despite the fact that these 
parties still benefit from competition, arguing that diversity can have its own benefits that mitigate the negative 
influence of underinvestment. The efficiency of innovation contests can be increased if other mechanisms are used, 
over and above those that are dependent on performance; an example of this is multiround contests, where a first 
round includes large numbers of contestants with low levels of contributions, followed by a second round that 
includes only those that have shown potential, which would increase the chances of someone in this smaller pool 
being successful (thus reducing underinvestment) (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008).     
 
 Open source software “allows users to design, build, distribute, and support their own programs- no 
manufacturer required”; this is part of a trend toward getting customers to be innovators (Thomke & von Hippel, 
2002). However, using customers to drive innovation requires an understanding of the differences between how 
value is created and captured in customer innovation models and the conventional models of innovation (Thomke & 
von Hippel, 2002). At the heart of problems in product development is the fact that information about needs is 
typically in the hands of the customer and information about how to satisfy those needs is typically in the hands of 
manufacturers (Thomke & von Hippel, 2002). 
 
THE NEXUS MODEL 
 
 What is clear from this body of literature considered above is that open innovation, termed probabilistic 
innovation here, offers new opportunities for the acceleration of innovation, or for the acceleration of the potential 
yield of innovation applied to problem solving. A tension in this body of literature exists, however, in that the 
differentiation between social and for-profit innovation does not seem to be clearly addressed in this body of 
literature. It is argued here that at the nexus of private, or proprietary crowdsourced R&D and crowdsourced R&D 
that is targeted at achieving social goals, there is an area of overlap between these two activities.  
 
 In Figure 2, a model of crowdsourced R&D at the junction of proprietary and non-proprietary innovation is 
shown. In this model, the innovation activity that occurs outside of the probability frontier is shown outside of the 
larger circle. This area outside of this circle represents first generation innovation. Within the outer circle are 
innovation activities that utilise some aspect of probabilistic innovation. The two circles within the larger one 
represent social, or non-proprietary probabilistic R&D (on the left) and proprietary probabilistic R&D (on the right). 
The intersection between these represents crowdsourced R&D activities that have both a commercial payoff as well 
as a social benefit. It is argued that this nexus represents an area in which a critical mass of incentives can be found. 
It is within this area perhaps that there is the most likelihood of breakthroughs, or successful innovations, which may 
benefit society.  
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Figure 2:  The Nexus Model, A Model Of The Crowdsourced R&D Space  
At The Nexus Of Proprietary And Non-Proprietary Innovation 
 
 According to this model, where both societal goals and the goals of profit-seeking are aligned is an 
innovation ‘space’ which can vastly increase the probability of successful problem-solving. The implication of this 
model is that different types of innovation activity should perhaps be ‘steered’ toward this area where social and 
proprietary R&D meet. In this area, a ‘critical mass’ might be reached, where incentives are aligned with social 
goals. It is argued here that if the proprietary incentives could be increased to a very high level, perhaps through the 
use of innovation contests, then such critical mass might be attained. An example of this process might be the use of 
pledged funds from countries around the world, which might enable a very large amount of money to be offered as a 
prize for an innovation contest to solve the problem of Ebola, or the problem of antibiotic or microbial resistance to 
pharmaceutical drugs. The Global Model (Callaghan, 2014a) suggests that breakthrough innovations with regard to 
healthcare could be achieved if the World Health Organisation were to oversee innovation contests on a global scale. 
Callaghan (2014a) suggests that if all countries in the world pledge their health budgets for a problem five years 
ahead of time it would cost the countries little if a solution was found; in this case the monies that they pay would be 
paid five years hence, and they would then gain the net present value of all outflows that would otherwise have 
arisen from this problem in years six, seven and so on. The Global Model (Callaghan, 2014) is an example of how 
social probabilistic R&D could occur in the same space as proprietary probabilistic R&D. In this instance, the use of 
extremely large ‘pledged’ bodies of funds can be used to ‘force’ the nexus of these two different areas of R&D. This 
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‘forced nexus’ also represents the embodiment of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on the part of those engaged in 
the probabilistic R&D process. The intrinsic motivation associated with open source contributors is combined with 
the extrinsic (monetary) motivation of those working within proprietary systems of R&D. The larger the incentive, 
the larger the area of the nexus between these two different forms of probabilistic R&D might become.  
 
 On the basis of this model, and the discussions above, Proposition 1 is offered, that the higher the financial 
incentives provided for social probabilistic R&D, the higher will be the overlap of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
on the part of contributors. Similarly, Proposition 2 is also derived, that the higher the financial incentives provided 
for social probabilistic R&D, the greater the area of overlap between social and proprietary R&D in their problem 
solving efforts. On the basis of these two propositions, Proposition 3 is further derived, that using SGR almost any 
problem can be solved whatsoever, the only constraints being (i) the size of the financial incentives, (ii) the extent to 
which the problem is solvable, and (iii) the time it might take.  These propositions rest on the assumptions discussed 
previously in the paper, namely that SGI and SGR offer a probabilistic mechanism of knowledge creation that can 
transcend constraints to innovation typically associated with FGI and FGR.  
 
 On the basis of these propositions, it is argued that problems such as antibiotic resistance, microbial 
resistance, or other problems that are a function of knowledge (and are inherently ‘soluble’, or solvable) can be 
solved relatively quickly, as long as sufficient financial resources are invested in the process. Problems relating to 
biological or medical problems are considered to largely be ‘finite’; this type of knowledge might be knowable, and 
not unknowable. The implication of this is that the solving of medical and biological problems might be uniquely 
suitable to this new paradigm.  
 
 Finally, it is argued that problems such as the failure of the pharmaceutical industry to solve problems such 
as microbial resistance and its failure to develop curative approaches to disease exist because FGI and FGR operates 
along a S-curve (Foster, 1985) that is offering declining results in relation to investments. This failure seems to be 
compounded by the incentives faced by the pharmaceutical industry (Callaghan, 2014c), a form of market failure. 
Curing disease would mean killing the ‘golden goose’ that continues to generate income as people need to keep 
taking medication (it needs to be paid for) their entire lives. It is understandable that such companies would be loath 
to find a cure if they generate billions over the life-time of patients.  
 
 In light of the above discussions, it is argued that SGI and SGR represent the next S-curve as forms of a 
process innovation in scientific research based on probabilistic mechanisms of knowledge creation. In conclusion, it 
is argued that these problems should be tackled in this way immediately. It is acknowledged that these processes are 
already happening, but the final argument made here is that the scale of these interventions needs to be ramped up, 
to the point that a nexus between social and proprietary innovation incentives is created, and the rate of problem 
solving can be increased, perhaps exponentially. In other words, a new paradigm in innovation can potentially exist, 
beyond the innovation threshold.      
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper offered the argument that innovation that does not use probabilistic mechanisms faces an 
innovation threshold constraint. This constraint was considered akin to the constraints faced by industries at the ‘top’ 
of an innovation S-curve (Foster, 1985); where progress has levelled off and increasing levels of investments 
produce diminishing returns. This paper suggests that SGI and SGR represent a new ‘S-curve’ in innovation, as the 
probabilistic mechanisms that underpin SGI and SGR differentiate this new paradigm from FGI and FGR. It was 
finally argued that almost any problem can be solved in radically shorter timeframes using the processes of this new 
paradigm, as long as these problems are inherently solvable. Biological and medical phenomena, for the most part, 
might perhaps be considered ‘finite systems’ that are inherently knowable.  The overarching argument made in this 
paper is that attempts to solve knowable problems should be set in motion immediately; under this potential new 
paradigm many societal problems we face should have no reason to continue to exist.   
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